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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
CLYDE GILBERT TATE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah
State Prison,

Case No.
12706

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
On July 7, 1971, the appellant filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of the Third
,Judicial District. A subsequent petition (R. 24-27) was
apparently sent to the court on August 28, 1971. The
matter was heard before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., on October 7, 1971, and the petition was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the lower court's
denial of appellant's writ of habeas corpus.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant was arrested on a charge of forgery on or
about August 14, 1970. Appellant appeared at a prelim.
inary hearing on the forgery charge and had counsel.
Appellant's counsel withdrew after this and Luke Pappas
was appointed to represent the appellant.
The forgery charge was dropped and appellant
pleaded guilty to the charge of issuing a fraudulent paper
on December 3, 1970. Appellant was represented by counsel. On December 15, 1970, appellant, with counsel, appeared before the Honorable Edward Sheya and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of from one to ten years.
Appellant appeared at a hearing on a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus on October 7, 1971. The writ was
denied and the court found that the appellant was in no
way denied his constitutional rights concerning the entry
of his guilty plea. The court also found that appellant
was advised and completely represented by effective
counsel.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS VOLUNTARILY AND INTELLIGENTLY MADE.
In discussing the rights involved in a waiver when
a guilty plea is entered, there are three constitutional
rights that are present. First, there is the privilege against

3

compubory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth
,\mendment and applicable to the states by reason of the
Fourteenth. Second is the right to trial by jury. Third
i:o the right to confront one's accusers.
In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459 (1969),
the co:ut in discussing the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedtff2, Rule 11, 18 U. S. C. A. governing the acceptance
of guilty pleas by district judges, stated that a defendant
who enters a guilty plea simultaneously waives several
constitutional rights, including his privilege against compuLory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury and
his iight to confront his accusers. For this waiver to be
valid under the due process clause, it must be an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege. Id. at 466.

The judge is required to inquire into the defendant's
understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea and that there is a factual basis for
the plea. That is, the conduct which the defendant admits, constitutes the offense charged in the indictment,
in the information or an offense included therein to which
the defendant has pled guilty. Id. at 467.
In order for a guilty plea to be acceptable it must
be voluntarily and intelligently made. The Supreme
Court of the United States made this very clear in Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969), when it stated: "It
was error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial
judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary."
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Id. at 242. The problem is to determine from the record
whether or not the guilty plea was voluntary and intern.
gent.
In deciding whether the plea was voluntary, it is
proper to consider all the circumstances. In Brady v.
United States, 397 U. S. 742 (1970), the court established
the test when it stated:
"The voluntariness of Brady's plea can be
determined only by considering all the relevant
circumstances surrounding it." Id. at 749.
The court went on to say:
"The standard as to the voluntariness of guilty
pleas must be essentially that defined by Judge
Tuttle of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: [A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware
of the direct consequences, including the actual
value of any commitments made to him by the
court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand
unless induced by threats (or promises to discon·
tinue improper harassment), or perhaps by prom·
ises that are by their nature improper as having
no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business
(e.g. bribes) ." Id. at 755.
The Brady court in its opinion discussed the requirement
that the guilty plea be intelligently made. In discussing
the case before it, the court said:
"The record before us also supports the conclusion
that Brady's plea was intelligently made. He was
advised by competent counsel, he was made aware
of the nature of the charge against him, and there
was nothing to indicate that he was incompetent
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or otherwise not in control of his mental facilities·
. . . Brady was aware of precisely what he was'
doing.... " Id. at 756.
Boykin, supra, did not change the law concerning a guilty
plea but as the court noted in footnote 4 of Brady:

"The new element added in Boykin was the requirement that the record must affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered
his plea understandingly and voluntarily." Id. at
747.
In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25 (1970), wherein
the defendant pled guilty to second degree murder, the
court reiterated its position taken in Brady that:

"The standard was and remains whether the plea
represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among
the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." Id. at 164. See also Boykin v. Al,abama, 395
u. s. 238, 244 (1969).

In applying this standard to the present case, it becomes clear that appellant's guilty plea on December 3,
1970 was voluntarily made. The trial court proceedings
(T. 3-8) show without any doubt whatsoever that petitioner voluntarily pleaded guilty. It shows:
(1) That he was fully aware of the consequences
of his plea (T. 4).
(2) That no promises or threats had been made
to him (T. 5-6).
(3) That he was not under the influence of any
narcotic drug or alcoholic beverage.
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(4) That he was not suffering from any mental
or physical illness (T. 6-7).
That he was aware he had a l'ight to a jury
1.nal and that the state would have to prove the
charges beyond a reasonable doubt (T. 4).
(6) That he would not have to testify or take the
witness stand (T. 5).

The transcript of the guilty plea shows that appellant was perfectly aware of all his rights and that he
knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty.
Therefore, the judgment denying appellant's writ of
habeas corpus on this issue should be affirmed.

POINT II.
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY FOUND
THAT APPELLANT WAS REPRESENTED
BY EFFECTIVE COUNSEL.
This Court has had to decide cases with similar allegations to the one presented by appellant. Among those
is Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 465 P. 2d 343
( 1970) . In reviewing the denial of a habeas corpus writ
where appellant had pleaded guilty in the trial court and
then alleged ineffective counsel, this Court stated:

"It is time to let imprisoned felons know that
even under the rules laid down by the Federal
Courts, freedom from confessed guilt, voluntarily,
knowingly, and inteJligently admitted, will not be
given by the courts because of alleged incompe·
tence of counsel unless there has been such a fla·
grant abuse of legal procedure as to amount to
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bad faith on the part of the lawyer. The Oklahoma
case of Yarbrough v. State, 457 P. 2d 826 (Old.
Cr. 1969), holds that merely alleging and asserting
inadequate representation on the part of counsel
is of no avail to a felon. The burden is upon one
to show that at the time of trial counsel failed in
some manner to represent him which failure resulted in prejudice to his defense."
The case of Andreason v. Turner, ______ Utah 2d ______ ,
493 P. 2d 1278 (1972), reiterated the standard used by
this Court in cases wherein the claim of ineffective counsel is claimed. The Court stated:
"The accused is entitled to the assistance of
a competent member of the Bar, who shows a
willingness to identify himself with the interests
of the defendant and present such defenses that
are available to him under the law and consistent
with the ethics of the profession. This requirement is not fulfilled by a sham or pretense of an
appearance in the record, by an attorney, who
manifests no real concern about the interests of
the accused."
In the case at bar, the appellant had been arraigned
on a forgery charge which was dropped later when appellant pleaded guilty to issuing fraudulent paper. Appellant
was represented by counsel at the arraignment but his
counsel then withdrew and the court appointed counsel,
Mr. Luke Pappas, to represent the appellant. Appellant
conferred with his counsel and waived preliminary hearing on the charge of issuing fraudulent paper because it
arose out of the same incident as the forgery charge (T.
p. 6, Dec. 3, 1970). Appellant claimed he had witnesses
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that could testify for him. However, he could not recall
or remember any of their names. Mr. Pappas testified
appellant could not give him any witnesses' names or any
other evidence that would tend to substantiate his claim
(T. p. 84, Oct. 7, 1971). Mr. Pappas did try to find witnesses at an establishment where appellant said he had
been when the event occurred but no one could be found
that would corroborate the appellant's story (T. p. 91,
Oct. 7, 1971). Mr. Pappas also stated that he was perfectly willing to represent the appellant at a jury trial
(T. p. 85, 91, Oct. 7, 1971).
Appellant when he pleaded guilty stated that he had
been advised of his rights by counsel, been informed of
the consequence of his plea, and that he had not received
any promises or been coerced or intimidated into entering
his plea (T. pp. 3-7, Dec. 3, 1970). Appellant also know·
ingly and intelligently waived preliminary hearing and
a jury trial (T. p. 5-7, Dec. 3, 1970).
A review of the record negates any inferences appel·
lant might make concerning ineffective counsel. The rec·
ord positively shows appellant's counsel tried to find evi·
dence to aid his client and was willing to proceed to trial
by jury if appellant wanted it. Appellant has not met his
burden to show that his counsel's representation was tan·
tamount to a sham or pretense of an appearance in the
record with no real concern about the interests of his
client.

i
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CONCLUSION
Appellant voluntarily and intelligently pleaded guilty
to the charge of issuing fraudulent paper. There is nothing in the record nor has any evidence been produced to
prove that appellant was denied effective counsel. Therefore, the lower court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B.. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

